(1) possible worlds framework
(2) Argument that proper names do rigidly designate
must say how issue of rigid designation arises,
stuff on counterpart theory vs. identity theory
(3) Argument that descriptions at best fix reference and
don't fix meaning
3b--why this argument requires proper names
to rigidly designate (above argument is essentially that if we
take descriptions to be the meanings of names, then we must give
up the view that names rigidly designate)
(4) Whither Frege?
3 reasons for Frege-Russell view
synonymy vs/ reference fixing
ftnote 10 another person could have done all Moses did.
begin a priori/necessity/analyticity discussion
(note that his characterization is different from Russell's)
reasons people thought necessary = a priori
Quine's arguments about the number of planets
and rigid designation to the rescue
important insight using historical essentialist thing
bare particulars vs. bundles (Locke vs. Berkeley)
big issue is same object in different possible worlds or counterparts
kripke points out that counterpart view is really unintuitive
blames tendency to think in terms of counterparts on thinking
of possible worlds the wrong way (Lewis' way--like you could
have a telescope)
So, we do not begin with worlds (which are supposed somehow
to be real, and whose qualities, but not whose objects, are perceptible
to us), and then ask about criteria of transworld identifiation;
on the contrary, we begin with the objects, which we have,
and can identify, int he actual world. We can then ask
whether certain things might have been true of the objects. (Kripke,
(1980, p. 53))
again description theory as theory about meaning or merely as
theory of reference
x is one meter long =def x is
as long as the standard meter stick in paris
does not ``give the meaning'' but only ``fixes the reference.
for one could heat the standard meter bar so that the something
is one meter long and not as long as the standard meter stick
in paris. So the definiens and definiendum are not synonymous
(the two phrases don't have the same meaning). Even if
the phrase works to fix the reference.
Again, the theory of rigid designation allows us to express
`one meter' designates rigidly while `the lenght of S
at t0'' does not.
epistemologically ``the standard meter stick is one
meter long'' is a priori, at least for anyone who uses
the meter stick to fix the reference.
metaphysically ``the standard meter stick is one meter
long'' is coningent
So definitions which fix a reference are (if true) contingent
and a priori knowable while definitions which give the
meaning are necessary and a priori knowable.
return to theory of proper names
(a) argues that if we take descriptions to give the meanings
of names, then names do not rigidly designate.
seems question begging.
Argues that when we fix the reference via description, it is
usually possible that the description ends up being false
of the object in question. Say the reference of ``hesperus''
was fixed by the the description ``the heavenly body appearing
at yonder position in the sky.'' We still want to be able
to say ''it might have been the case that Hesperus appeared in
a different position.'' [David Chalmers views Kripke as
having essentiall bifurcated sense into the reference fixing
aspect (which is how we locate obects in the actual world) and
the intension fixing aspect, (which is what makes an object the
same object in all possible worlds). The second aspect
may be totally unknown to speakers of the languge, it is metaphysical,
not epistemelogical. (the remarks on page 59 support Chalmers'
view.] and the best way to accomodate this insight is if we take
names like ``Hesperus'' to be rigid designators and take the
reference fixing description not to be a rigid designator.
Note- Donellan's might be viewed as arguing that the reference
fixing description is sometimes not only false in some possible
worlds, but actually false in the this world.
again marks difference between him and Russell/Frege
If 'Moses' means the same as a description D, then saying 'Moses
didn't exist' is the same as saying 'the existence and uniqueness
conditions for a certain description are not fulfilled,'
and to say that Moses did exist would be to say that they were
so fulfilled. As with the argument Searle gave, Kripke
seems to be strong here.
arguments agains the cluster theory
Kripke restates Searle's argument against Searle's own theory.
Couldn't we discover that Aristotle didn't do anything we think
important point that Kripke only needs one case where we could
say that Johah still exists even though all the things
we believe about him are false.
circularity stuff (pretty confusing)